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The online stolen data market: Disruption and intervention 
approaches 
This paper brings a new taxonomy and collation of intervention and disruption 
methods that can be applied to the online stolen data market. These online 
marketplaces are used to buy and sell identity and financial information, as 
well as the products and services that enable this economy. This paper 
combines research findings from computer science with criminology to provide 
a multidisciplinary approach to crimes committed with the use of technology.  
Keywords: online black market; stolen data; crime prevention; intervention and 
disruption; underground economy 
Introduction 
Over the last two decades, research has identified a range of offenses that are enabled 
through computer technology and the Internet.
1
 For example, communication systems 
streamline the solicitation process of the sex trade,
2
 increase the available number of 
targets for fraud,
3
 and engender stalking and threatening communications that can 
directly affect victims at any time of the day.
4
 At the same time, technology has also 
facilitated forms of offending that would not otherwise exist, including computer 
hacking where actors compromise existing boundaries of ownership to gain access to 
sensitive information and affect data.
5
  
The threat posed by unauthorised access should not be underestimated, 
especially given the economic harm caused by the misuse of personal information, 
including credit and debit card account numbers. Sensitive data now resides in various 
electronic databases on-line that can be remotely accessed and compromised by 
hackers.
6
 Numerous sensitive databases are compromised every year,
7
 some of which 
lead to losses of millions of credit cards or personal data.
8
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The substantial quantity of information obtained by hackers and attackers have 
led to the growth of on-line markets where cybercriminals can sell stolen data to 
others.
9
 Research suggests actors engage one another via Internet Relay Chat (IRC) or 
Russian-language web-based forums, although a small proportion also operate in 
English.
10
 These markets facilitate the sale of credit card numbers and personally 
identifiable information, as well as resources to facilitate various cybercrimes.
11
 The 
sales process is driven by advertisements posted by sellers describing the products 
they have to offer, their pricing structures, contact information, and any rules 
regarding the transaction process. In turn, buyers contact the seller, negotiate the 
terms of sale, send money directly to the seller, and wait for their products to be 
delivered.
12
  
Estimates on the scope of harm caused by stolen data market operations 
suggests they may cause millions of dollars in losses to individual victims and 
corporations, as well as enabling various forms of cybercrime across the globe.
13
 
Limited research has given recommendations on methods to disrupt markets or affect 
their operations.
14
 There is, however, virtually no criminological research considering 
these strategies or the ways that they may be practically applied by law enforcement 
agencies, consumers, policy makers, and commercial organisations. This study 
addresses this gap through an analysis of the various disruption and intervention 
methods that have been proposed and implemented by academics, industry, and 
policy-makers alike.  
The current focus to disrupt online marketplaces centres on investigation and 
prosecution of key players.
15
 In 2004, Shadowcrew, a stolen data marketplace, was 
targeted by law enforcement using a police informant. Following this operation, FBI 
agents infiltrated the DarkMarket forum, culminating in the agency running the server 
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and hosting the communication.
16
 In 2012, international efforts involving seven 
countries resulted in three arrests and 36 websites being shut down.
17
 Such a 
takedown of stolen data markets involves substantive high profile investigative 
resources, which, in the long term, may have a limited disruption effect on the larger 
underground economy for information.
18
 Thus, there is some tension with the law 
enforcement approach of targeting high value, small volume type offences, which 
seemingly ignores small value, but potentially high volume, type crimes.  
Previous research on data markets is largely descriptive, documenting the 
products sold and practices of market actors.
19
  While valuable, they do not inform 
policy-makers as to the most vulnerable points in the process of data sales that may 
facilitate successful implementation of disruption strategies. This paper extends recent 
research by Hutchings and Holt,
20
 which is the only study to date that has applied a 
crime script analysis to demonstrate the step-by-step interactions in the stolen data 
market, how they operate, and the actors involved. Crime scripts are useful in 
identifying the significant steps in criminal operations that can be targeted for crime 
prevention.
21
  
The crime script that was developed described the preparations to entry, 
including setting up the necessarily client software and accounts, and taking steps 
towards anonymity and security. Some actors operate in multiple marketplaces. 
Marketplaces differ in their openness, the predominant language used, their 
specialisation in different products or services, and the ways in which they regulate 
users’ behaviours. Some forums provide tutorials and discussions to teach specialised 
knowledge, both free and for a fee, and some advertisers claim to provide technical 
support.  
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Forums provide formal marketplace rules, which are policed by moderators. 
Sellers of credit card data often set out their own terms, advising the conditions under 
which their products would be replaced if declined. In addition to learning these 
formal rules, newcomers are required to learn the jargon and slang that are commonly 
used. A precondition for sellers is having services, or obtaining and manufacturing 
products to trade. In some cases, sellers re-sell products or services obtained 
elsewhere. Data offered for sale are obtained from data breaches, malware, phishing, 
or skimming credit cards.  
Advertisements are placed in accordance with the rules of the forum. Some 
forums offer a verification process, whereby moderators test a sample of the products 
offered. Actors on the marketplace are communicative, commenting on threads, 
initiating and responding to discussion points, and sometimes exchanging information 
relating to law enforcement activities. Advertisements also include private contact 
details for the purpose of negotiating and finalising sales. A variety of money transfer 
providers are used, with payment usually required before delivery, or using an escrow 
service.  
The transfer of stolen data from the seller to the buyer takes place 
electronically outside of the forum or IRC channel used to sell products. However, 
physical goods, such as skimmers, are packaged and sent to the purchaser by mail, 
courier, or in some cases, delivery by hand or local transport. Sellers manage their 
reputations by seeking positive reviews within their advertising thread so that others 
can publicly validate the seller reputation. However, negative reviews are also 
common which may hinder the reputation development of the vendor. Sellers looking 
to exchange their currency, and to launder their proceeds, can utilise the providers 
who advertised these services.  
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This paper contributes to and extends the existing literature by researchers like 
Hutchings and Holt
22
 by considering the types of interventions that can be applied at 
these points. The intervention strategies discussed are not intended as an exhaustive or 
complete representation of all current examples employed.  Rather, this analysis 
serves as a convenience sample representing some of the most prominent strategies 
either previously or actively employed to disrupt data markets.  The attention focused 
on these strategies by academic, industry, and law enforcement sources would suggest 
they have utility, though there has been no empirical review of their value to date.  
Thus, this analysis provides an overview of their utility from a situational crime 
prevention perspective.  
The implications of this study for law enforcement across the globe and for 
computer scientists are considered in detail, with an emphasis on police legitimacy 
and visibility, along with the potential for offender displacement. These 
considerations are important for crime prevention generally, and are especially so for 
online crime, where displacement opportunities increase, along with the opportunities 
for actions that may not be perceived as legitimate. The paper considers these 
concepts in turn, before discussing the specific crime prevention strategies applicable 
to the stolen data market. This latter part has been structured by interventions aimed at 
the act, actor, and marketplace for stolen data.  
Situational crime prevention and disruption initiatives 
 Situational crime prevention often takes a different focus from that of the 
criminal justice system; namely, to catch and punish offenders.
23
 Levi and Maguire,
24
 
in relation to organised crime, stated that crime prevention should be aimed at the 
particular forms of crime, or the ‘acts’, as well as those who were involved in their 
commission, or the ‘actors’. This approach to crime prevention and disruption is 
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situational in nature, as the aim is to change the environment in which crime occurs. 
The situational crime prevention approach applies multiple theories. One method is 
the routine activity approach, which posits that crime reduction can be achieved by 
increasing the capability of guardians, decreasing the suitability of targets, and 
decreasing the presence of motivated offenders.
25
 On the other hand, rational choice 
theory
26
 suggests that increasing the effort to commit a crime, increasing the 
perceived likelihood of detection, and reducing the expected benefit, will deter crime. 
One intervention may have several effects, such as both increasing the effort and 
reducing the benefits.  
We note that situational crime prevention methods go beyond deterrence 
principles, in that they do not seek to solely deter crime through the threat of 
punishment. Nevertheless, some of the principles of deterrence are applicable to crime 
prevention more generally. In particular, Gibbs
27
 and Jacobs
28
 expanded the concept 
of deterrence to incorporate restrictive deterrence, which refers to reducing the 
severity and/or frequency of offending to reduce the risk of punishment. Restrictive 
deterrence contrasts with absolute deterrence, or the avoidance of the criminal 
behaviour entirely, due to the threat of punishment.
29
 Similarly, we may think of 
restrictive intervention; that is the reduction in the rate or gravity of offending through 
crime prevention principles.  
Crime script analysis can inform situational crime prevention, and has been 
used in this way to identify intervention methods in relation to drug manufacturing,
30
 
child sex offending,
31
 and organised crime.
32
 Chiu et al.
33
 approached this task by 
breaking down interventions aimed at the offender, the guardians (such as regulators 
and those that sell precursor chemicals), and the locations where drug laboratories 
were present, by the script scenes. In contrast, Leclerc et al.
34
 outlined prevention 
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strategies by applying the conditions that facilitated or enabled the offence to take 
place (such as the lack of a suitable guardian and the presence of a vulnerable child), 
to each scene. Meanwhile, Hancock and Laycock
35
 categorised the actions for each 
scene into whether they related to criminal lifestyles, networking of offenders, or the 
primary criminal act, and applied the intervention approaches to these. In this paper, 
we use the points of intervention from Hutchings’ and Holts’ crime script analysis of 
online stolen data markets.
36
  
Another point to consider when developing intervention strategies is who is 
responsible for their development and implementation. Cohen and Felson
37
 use the 
term ‘capable guardian’ to include those that have the potential to discourage 
offenders, whether they be the owner of the property, law enforcement agencies, 
regulatory bodies, or any other individual or agency. Levi and Maguire
38
, however, 
refer to ‘ownership’ of crime prevention problems and focus on entities who can deal 
with offenses in different ways. Organisations identified by Levi and Maguire
39
 
include the public sector, including the operational level, such as law enforcement 
(customs and policing agencies); the strategic level, such as policy development; and 
regulatory bodies. They point out that transnational crimes also require a transnational 
approach, including non-government organisations that tackle money laundering and 
other cross-border offences.  
The public sector does not have sole ownership over crime prevention 
strategies. Additional guardians for the stolen data market would include banks, 
merchants, and security companies, who provide protective software programs, such 
as antivirus software or firewalls that minimize the likelihood of malicious software 
infections or attempts to penetrate the user's system.
40
 Similarly, Internet Service 
Providers and web hosting companies that may knowingly or unknowingly host these 
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forums and markets could be vital in securing evidence and records of connections to 
sites.
41
 As noted by Garland,
42
 it is not solely the state’s responsibility to prevent or 
control crime. In relation to frauds and scams, especially those that involve an online 
element, the state can be particularly limited due to the challenges presented by 
jurisdiction and anonymity.  
Legitimacy 
Ensuring that interventions are perceived as legitimate, in that they have public 
acceptance, is essential to their success. Legitimacy has been found to be just as, if 
not more, important as deterrence principles in influencing compliance with the law. 
Surveys by Sunshine and Tyler
43
 examined the relationship between compliance with 
the law and evaluations of the legitimacy of the New York City Police Department, as 
well as perceived risk of being caught and punished. Perceived legitimacy was found 
to be a stronger predictor of compliance than risk, although both were significant 
factors. Laws, policies, and institutions that are seen as overstepping legitimacy 
potentially lessen overall authority in a state.
44
 Authorities need to be perceived as 
legitimate to gain the trust, support, and cooperation of the public, as well as 
compliance with the law.
45
 In relation to state use of authority, it is important to ask 
questions relating to whether the state should have the requisite power; whether there 
is oversight and supervision in the use of that power, such as judicial authorisation 
through the issuance of warrants; how the state responds to abuses of power; and the 
level of transparency about the use (and abuse) of power.
46
 These questions relate to 
procedural justice, or the fairness of the processes in which authorities make decisions 
and exercise their powers.
47
 
Other perceptual issues relating to how the public and law enforcement view 
cybercrime may also be important when considering what countermeasures are 
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appropriate. For example, online black markets are generally not visible to the general 
public, unless they go looking for them. On the other hand, cybercrime types such as 
malware and spam may be considered more of a nuisance than a threat due to their 
comparatively high visibility.
48
 The general public may not have much knowledge of 
how their personal data being stolen relates to how their data are misused. Even 
murkier to the average person, as well as to law enforcement agencies, may be the 
knowledge of the intermediary steps between these two nuisances, such as the trade of 
their personal information in online black markets. To whit, less than 20% of 
respondents in a sample of state and local law enforcement could accurately define 
the term carding in relation to cybercrime, and 36% had never heard the term 
before.
49
 If law enforcement do not view this problem as a threat or worthy of 
investigation, it is likely that they will not support attempts to disrupt these 
marketplaces.
50
 
When developing legitimate intervention methods, there should also be 
consideration of the effects on the rights and freedoms of the law-abiding majority.
51
 
For example, intervention methods aimed at anonymity networks such as Tor may 
adversely affect those who use the services for good, and cause harm to individuals 
whose identities are made known. In addition, for such international marketplaces, 
there should be consideration as to the ethical questions about whether legislative 
protections apply to all, or just those who are citizens of a particular country.  
Displacement 
While disrupting the scripts involved in the crime commission process may prevent 
crime, it may also result in displacement to alternative locations, targets, times, 
methods, offenders or offence type.
52
 Research on prostitution in the US, for example, 
has found that increased patrols lead some clients to seek sex workers in other places 
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in a city, or to move online to decrease the risk of arrest.
53
 The introduction of chip 
and PIN credit cards in the United Kingdom has seen a displacement from card-
present, to card-not-present payment fraud.
54
 In the context of on-line black markets, 
an offender may displace from one form of computer-mediated communication to 
another, such as from IRC to forums. In fact, there is limited evidence that such 
transitions have already occurred, creating multiple markets concurrently for data and 
other products
55
. Displacement occurs when the script changes as a result of the 
intervention method that has been put in place. Therefore, intervention approaches 
should be evaluated to ensure that they create the intended effects, and are not 
generating unforeseen or undesirable consequences. 
Alternative disruption and intervention opportunities 
Disruption and intervention opportunities that are aimed at the act, the actor, and the 
marketplace are outlined below. The acts that are the subject of intervention are those 
that relate to the black market economy, such as selling tools to steal data, selling 
stolen data, and providing drop, cashier, and money laundering services. The actors 
include those identified in the crime script analysis by Hutchings and Holt,
56
 namely 
sellers, buyers, suppliers, moderators (who maintain order on the forums and apply 
the rules), administrators (who organise the platforms and the hosting of the actual 
forums), and teachers (who write tutorials and provide advice). These roles are not 
mutually exclusive, as one individual may take on multiple roles, such as seller and 
buyer, or administrator and moderator.  
Interventions aimed at the Act 
Most data advertised for sale in the marketplaces are stolen from data breaches, using 
keyloggers, phishing, or by skimming credit cards at the point of sale or at ATMs.
57
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Intervention methods aimed at user authentication may reduce the success of 
keylogging and phishing attacks, and therefore the availability of stolen data (the 
suitable targets). One example is Pico, which aims to increase the security of user 
accounts by replacing passwords and PINs with a token-based authentication 
system.
58
 It is proposed that Pico, which is still under development, may also be used 
as an authentication system for smartcards,
59
 therefore such a device may not only 
protect data from being stolen from individual accounts, but would also protect that 
data from being used, such as authenticating chip and PIN and card-not-present 
transactions. It is anticipated that there will be disruption in the market for stolen 
credit card credentials if there is an increase the effort required for their subsequent 
use.  
In some cases, technical measures are available to safeguard data but are not 
effectively implemented. For example, a study by Mirante and Cappos
60
 into high-
profile data breaches found that many organisations did not use best practice when 
storing user credentials. Data stored in plaintext requires no extra effort on behalf of 
those with access to the database to obtain credentials including passwords and 
payment data, and hashed data that have not been salted, by way of adding random 
data, can be cracked using brute force. By improving the security by which data are 
stored, transmitted, and used by individual users as well as by the organisations that 
hold their data, the availability of products to sell is reduced and the effort required to 
obtain useable stolen data is increased. 
Banks use fraud detection methods to identify suspicious transactions on 
credit cards, or against merchants.
61
 Hutchings and Holt
62
 identified that actors on the 
stolen data markets were concerned about fraud detection methods, which reduce the 
expected benefits. Tutorials are provided on forums providing information about how 
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fraud detection systems work, discussions about gaining employment at target 
organisations to learn more about them, and advising that using credit card checkers 
may ultimately be counterproductive as cards may be more likely to be subsequently 
detected. In addition to suspicious credit card transactions, banks and other financial 
institutions have the capacity to detect other suspicious transactions, such as those 
undertaken by money mules or for the purposes of money laundering.  
Banks are increasingly proactive in fraud detection among their card-holders, 
increasing their capability of guardians, by monitoring marketplaces for cards that 
they have issued. According to The Economist,
63
 banks are purchasing credit card 
credentials to detect those entering the black market. There could potentially also be 
scope for banks to covertly advertise credit card checkers on black markets, if they are 
not already doing so, to identify compromised credit cards that are being checked 
before being sold on. 
Merchants may also be guardians for stolen data, particularly as they usually 
carry the financial burden of card-not-present payment fraud. Merchants may employ 
their own fraud detection methods, and can also pay for subscription services that 
allow them to perform additional checks such as address and card verification.
64
 In 
relation to carding, there are often multiple merchants that are targeted: first is the 
merchant that is used for checking to see if the credit card details are valid; second are 
the merchants that are subsequently targeted for purchasing goods that the offender 
exchanges for a monetary benefit. Popular websites, including charities, are used to 
make small transactions that are unlikely to be detected by fraud detection systems in 
real time.
65
 Card checkers are available as a service, which operate using botnets. 
Peacock and Friedman
66
 argue that if merchants that are targeted for checking credit 
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card services are better able to protect themselves, can help prevent further fraud from 
taking place.  
Peacock and Friedman
67
 suggest that merchants utilise anti-automation 
technology for online credit card transactions to stop botnets automating credit card 
transactions. This would require offenders to test cards manually, increasing the 
effort, cost and time involved. Time is one of the crucial elements in this approach, as 
when cards are tested in batches, by the time the entire batch has been tested, it is 
more likely that those tested at the beginning will have been caught by fraud detection 
systems. Anti-automation technologies utilise CAPTCHAs, reputation methods, proof 
of work problems, and real time polymorphic web content.
68
 However, the approach 
put forward by Peacock and Friedman
69
 assumes that credit cards are being sold, and 
checked, in large batches, which may not always be the case.  
The stolen data market economy includes the sale of identification 
documents.
70
 ‘Scanned’ digital forgeries, as well as real and counterfeit documents, 
such as drivers licences and passports, are advertised for sale. In Australia, the federal 
government established the Document Verification Service as a countermeasure 
against fake identity documents. This service allows government agencies, as well as 
financial and telecommunication organisations, to cross reference government issued 
documents, such as birth certificates, citizenship certificates, driver licenses, marriage 
certificates, passports, and visas, to validate their authenticity.
71
 While this may be an 
effective intervention to identify counterfeit identity documents, and increase the 
perceived likelihood of detection, it does not detect the use of stolen documents, or 
those where the backend database has been tampered with. 
A number of regulatory approaches may also have positive effects in 
preventing acts associated with the online marketplaces. Those reviewed here include 
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data breach notifications, regulations relating to payment providers, and money 
laundering regulations. Mandatory data breach notification requirements have been 
introduced to a number of jurisdictions worldwide, albeit with differing 
requirements.
72
 One of the rationales for data breach notification is that end users are 
in a position to identify any suspicious activity relating to their accounts or credit 
histories, and can therefore intervene to reduce subsequent misuse of the data. To 
empirically assess whether mandatory data breach reporting reduces identity theft, 
Romanosky, Telang, and Acquisiti
73
 compared levels of identity theft reported in 
states that had data breach notification laws with levels reported in states that did not. 
Data were sourced from the US Federal Trade Commission’s Identity Theft Data 
Clearinghouse, which collects identity theft complaints from victims, across a period 
of eight years (2002 to 2009). The study found that, controlling for the extent that data 
breach notification increases the likelihood of identity theft victimisation being 
detected and subsequently reported, adoption of data breach disclosure laws reduced 
identity theft caused by data breaches by a statistically significant amount of 6.1 
percent, on average.
74
  
Another area for tighter regulation is the payment mechanisms used by actors 
to purchase goods, receive payments, and to launder the proceeds. There are a 
multitude of payment providers and digital currencies listed on online black markets 
for these purposes.
75
 There is certainly scope to increase regulations for payment 
providers so that further steps are taken to minimise their involvement in black 
markets and reduce expected benefits to offenders. For example, Western Union do 
not require identification when sending amounts (less than £600); for receiving and 
sending amounts less than £1999.99, two forms of non-primary identification, such as 
a utility bill or a confirmation letter from a hotel are accepted.
76
 As noted, multiple 
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forms of primary and secondary identification, including drivers licences and 
passports, are readily available in online black markets.
77
 Unlike Western Union, 
which is based on traditional currencies and therefore more likely to be subject to 
local regulatory agencies, digital currencies are less likely to be regulated. However, it 
is noted that two digital currency providers, Liberty Reserve and e-gold, were alleged 
to facilitate money laundering and online crime, and were shut down amid United 
States prosecutions.
78
  
Money laundering is regulated in many countries, with requirements for banks 
and other agencies to report transactions that exceed a certain amount, as well as other 
‘suspicious transactions’. However, such requirements may be circumvented by 
making transactions appear legitimate,
79
 as well as techniques such as ‘smurfing’, 
whereby multiple smaller transactions are processed using different identities. 
Therefore, there is scope for improving money laundering regulations, including 
reviewing how they apply to digital currencies.  
Other ways in which those with ownership of the online black market problem 
could consider infiltrating the marketplace include advertising as drops, who receive 
stolen goods; as hammerers, who enter stolen card data; and as mules, to receive 
stolen goods. This could potentially allow for the recovery of stolen goods, as well as 
identifying stolen credit card details. While the principal aim of such intervention 
would be fraud detection, information obtained in such a way could also be used for 
investigative purposes.  
The ownership of some of the strategies referred to above belong to 
organisations. For example, while individuals are the users of multifactor 
identification, it is companies that implement these systems. However, end users can 
also take ownership of crime prevention strategies by detecting fraudulent email 
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messages, unusual computer behaviour that may indicate malware infection, and 
avoiding low security websites. Individuals may also be recruited into the black 
market economy using work-from-home scams, to receive carded goods and to 
participate in money laundering as an unwitting mule. Therefore, interventions aimed 
towards end users focus on the provision of fraud awareness, as well as tools to block 
access to malicious emails, websites or software.  
Interventions aimed at the Actor 
A number of disruption techniques have been proposed to promote distrust within 
marketplaces, and therefore reduce motivated offenders. Several of these techniques 
relate to creating the appearance of mistrust between buyers and sellers, referred to as 
‘lemonising the market’.80 A lemon market is one in which there is quality 
uncertainty; therefore those selling quality products are unable to differentiate from 
sellers with poor quality products, and cannot compete with their low prices.
81
 As a 
result, engaging in the market would increase the effort and cost of crime for buyers, 
and reduce their expected benefits.  
 Franklin, et al.
82
 suggested that marketplaces can be lemonised using Sybil 
and slander attacks to create quality uncertainty. A Sybil attack involves the creation 
of multiple fictitious actors, who generate a positive reputation by undertaking 
fictitious transactions and providing feedback to one another. When non-fictitious 
actors request to purchase goods, payment is accepted, however the goods are never 
received. The fictitious seller will then generate negative feedback for being a ripper, 
which is argued would generate distrust in the marketplace. Hoe, et al.
83
 suggested an 
extension of the Sybil attack. Named the ‘fake peach’ attack, in this variation law 
enforcement engage in actual sales so as to identify and take action on actors 
purchasing stolen data. 
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However, there are a number of potential problems with the Sybil and fake 
peach attacks. One such problem is that the fictitious actors first generate a positive 
reputation by leaving false feedback. While this may lead to distrust in positive 
feedback in the long term, Holt, et al.
84
 found that sellers with positive feedback had 
significantly higher advertised prices for dumps, eBay and PayPal credentials, and 
that ‘ripper’ forums, which were characterised by high levels of negative feedback, 
had significantly lower advertised prices. Therefore, the Sybil attack may be 
advantageous to other sellers on the marketplace due to the positive feedback that is 
being left on the forums. In addition, there may be legitimacy concerns in relation to 
accepting payment for goods with either no intention to deliver, or delivering fake 
data. However, the slander attack may overcome these obstacles. 
The slander attack involves leaving false feedback for sellers claiming that 
they are rippers.
85
 This attack increases the effort required by sellers, and decreases 
their potential profits and benefits. It also increases the perceived risk to buyers that 
the seller is a ripper, increasing the difficulty inherent in participating in the market. 
Another variation on the Sybil attack may be to undertake the first action, and flood 
the marketplace with fictitious actors, but to not complete the remainder of the attack. 
Therefore, the fictitious advertisers do not generate a positive reputation and, by not 
replying to those who wish to purchase their products or services, create frustration 
with the marketplace, and potentially negative feedback. This solves the 
aforementioned problems of increasing the apparent number of sellers with positive 
feedback on a marketplace, and no payment exchanges hands. One potential problem 
with this approach is that a carefully moderated board may ban or blacklist sellers that 
do not provide data for a check. However, they may not have verified sellers 
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participating in the site or do not have sellers who actively engage in the checking 
process.
86
  
Nevertheless, Herley and Florêncio
87
 suggest that, as the online black market 
is already essentially a lemon market, market participants are themselves conducting 
Sybil attacks. This could at least be the case in lower tier marketplaces, while higher 
tier marketplaces would be harder to enter. By disrupting lower-tier markets by 
lemonising them, it could increase the effort required by both buyers and sellers in 
gaining entry to the higher tier marketplaces.  
The crime script developed by Hutchings and Holt
88
 provides additional 
insights into the marketplace that can lead to further disruption and intervention 
strategies. Other potential ways to create distrust in the marketplace is to highlight the 
insecurity of the products and services sold on the marketplace, some of which are 
used to steal data. The legitimacy of this approach does not need to be questioned, as 
the security concerns are real. Research has shown that backdoors have been written 
into phishing kits,
89
 which are both sold on the marketplaces and used to obtain stolen 
data. The backdoor consists of an obfuscated email address, to which the creator of 
the kit receives the credentials that have been obtained during the phishing attempt. 
Similarly, in 2012, Slowloris, a denial of service tool, was found to include the Zeus 
Trojan.
90
 More recently, the trustworthiness of the encryption software TrueCrypt has 
been questioned after a post appeared on the official website claiming that it was not 
safe to use.
91
 By highlighting real or potential insecurities, they can be leveraged to 
generate mistrust and increase the perceived risk. An alternative approach, with the 
appropriate judicial authority and oversight, is to gain control over such backdoor 
destinations, with the ongoing goal of identifying compromised accounts. These can 
then be flagged with the account provider, such as the bank or financial institution. By 
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blocking the accounts for subsequent misuse, the benefits for the purchaser of the 
stolen data can be subsequently decreased.  
Additional ways to generate distrust in the market could include fictitious 
actors making fictitious claims, questioning reputations, providing false information, 
and promoting distrust in competing marketplaces. Fictitious claims could include 
that a product has been sent for verification but that the moderator took it and never 
provided a review, that other actors’ accounts have been taken over by law 
enforcement or competitors, or that card checkers are used to steal credit card 
credentials. Questioning reputations could include suggesting that positive feedback 
had been bought or was actually posted by the seller, or questioning the (il)legitimacy 
of the marketplace administers.  
Providing false information could include tutorials for matters in relation to 
specialist knowledge that frustrates others’ efforts, and disseminating information 
about how to package goods, which actually makes them appear distinctive and easier 
to identify in transit. In addition to false information, providing real information about 
law enforcement activities to increase perceived risk could entail publicising arrests 
and successful prosecutions. Finally, as it would be expected that moderators would 
remove defaming posts relating to their own marketplaces, it could be claimed that 
competing marketplaces are not trustworthy. 
Prosecuting offenders is another way of disrupting actors on online black 
marketplaces. The aim of law enforcement operations in this regard would be 
deterrence, both specific (deterring offenders from re-offending) and general 
(deterring others from commencing or continuing offending). There is some literature 
in relation to online offenders that indicate that it is the likelihood of detection that 
has the greatest deterrent effect, rather than the harshness of the available 
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punishment.
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 In relation to cybercrime, challenges faced by law enforcement include 
having the necessary resources and powers to investigate complex matters, the time 
required to conduct cross-jurisdictional investigations and obtain evidence using 
current procedures, and recruiting, training, and retaining personnel with the 
appropriate skills.
93
 These challenges may influence prosecution rates. Inconsistent 
laws and police resources also allow offenders to base their operations or select their 
victims in jurisdictions where they are least likely to be detected or prosecuted.
94
 This 
in turn may have implications on the amount of crime that occurs online if 
perpetrators believe that they can offend with impunity, and negative effects for the 
reputation of policing agencies. 
Faced with such challenges, there are a number of matters to take into 
consideration when selecting which offenders to target. First, law enforcement may 
select a particular marketplace to target, such as the FBI’s DarkMarket operation. The 
second option is to target particular individuals, or groups of individuals who work 
together, whether they are operating in one or several marketplaces. Anderson
95
 
proposes randomised enforcement, whereby low value or low volume offenders are 
just as likely to be prosecuted as more serious offenders. The argument is that by 
randomly selecting complaints to investigate, it provides the opportunity to identify 
large-scale frauds that may otherwise escape scrutiny because of the low values 
involved, or alternatively will have a greater deterrence effect, in that even low-level 
offenders will see that there is a risk inherent in offending of being detected. 
Although there are challenges faced by police, electronic data may be 
particularly useful for investigative purposes. For example, financial investigation 
techniques can be effective in detecting the extent of offenders’ activities,96 and 
transactions using Bitcoin are particularly open to traffic analysis.
97
 Further 
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investigative tools being developed include a method to detect associations between 
actors on online black markets, or users with multiple accounts, using stylometry to 
identify similarities in writing style.
98
  
It is apparent that corruption is one element that enables the black market 
economy, presumably decreasing the perceived likelihood of detection, as well as the 
effort required. Hutchings and Holt
99
 identified a number of organisational types that 
were discussed on the forums as either having employees that would assist in the 
black market economy, such as law enforcement and customs agents, bank 
employees, and sales staff who operate point of sale terminals (to either skim credit 
cards, or collude and conduct fraudulent transactions). Other organisations were 
identified as targets: places to attempt to gain employment as corrupt insiders, so as to 
access the organisation’s systems and data. Conductors on public transport in Russia 
were also identified as playing a role in transporting plastics locally.
100
 Law 
enforcement have a dual advantage in implementing anti-corruption strategies within 
their own agencies, as not only may it disrupt the black market economy, but by 
reducing corruption, and being transparent about the process, there should be positive 
effects in relation to perceived legitimacy. 
McCusker
101
 argues that successfully addressing systematic corruption 
requires a systematic approach. Not only do governments need to recognise and 
prioritise corruption, but they also require assistance in developing and implementing 
policy. Some of the specific initiatives that McCusker
102
 recommends include 
establishing an anti-corruption agency, ensuring adequate pay, staff rotation, ensuring 
staff are not politically appointed, creating disincentives for corruption, removing 
opportunity, increasing transparency, and addressing cultural issues within the 
organisation. Smith and Jorna
103
 note that, as computer systems are used for 
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communication and the execution of corrupt activities, they can also incorporate 
measures to prevent and detect corruption, such as internally restricting access to data, 
or monitoring when and from where computer systems are accessed. Organisations 
targeted by would-be corrupt insiders may also find that background checks 
undertaken at the time of recruitment increase their ability to guard their computer 
systems and processes that would otherwise be valuable in the stolen data economy. 
Interventions aimed at the marketplace 
Marketplaces may be disrupted through censorship practices, or controlled by law 
enforcement. Interventions may also include disrupting the infrastructure, including 
communication, and anonymity systems. Censorship and Internet filtering may reduce 
marketplace visibility and availability, at least to those under the relevant regime who 
do not have the prerequisite knowledge to overcome censorship technologies. 
Murdoch and Anderson
104
 outline the various filtering mechanisms available, such as 
TCP/IP header filtering, TCP/IP content filtering, DNS tampering, and http proxy 
filtering. These interventions increase the effort required by sellers and buyers to visit 
online marketplaces.  
Alternative disruption interventions that also block access to websites instead 
increase the effort required by administrations to keep a site running. These include 
domain deregistration and server takedown.
105
 Domain deregistration is possible if the 
site is registered under the domain of a country that prohibits the hosted content. 
However, it appears that the operation of online black markets may not be prohibited 
in all locations. For example, the terms and conditions for .ru (Russian) top level 
domains refers to deregistration of domain names for phishing pages, botnet control 
and child exploitation material.
106
 Therefore, there is the potential for displacement to 
top level domains with more lenient abuse provisions. Similarly, server takedown 
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requires that the hosted content be objectionable under the jurisdiction of the physical 
location of the server.
107
  
In relation to censorship, whether that be by Internet filtering, domain 
deregistration and server takedown, a number of legitimacy concerns may be raised. 
These include the process by which sites are deemed to be offensive, how the public 
can be assured that content is not being blocked that should not be, and about freedom 
of access to information. There are also a number of ways that censorship and 
filtering may be overcome, including displacement to VPNs and anonymity networks, 
such as Tor or I2P. Law enforcement may operate VPNs to observe traffic, use an 
informant, as they did with the Shadowcrew takedown,
108
 or obtain logs from VPN 
providers, as they did with an investigation into the compromise of data held by Sony 
Pictures.
109
 However, talk on the forums indicate that some actors are displacing from 
VPNs to other systems, such as Tor and botnet-based proxy services, as they no 
longer trust VPN providers.  
Anonymity networks may be used when visiting online black markets. Tor can 
also be used to hide the location of services, including some online black market 
forums. Hidden services are then accessed through the Tor network. Some attacks on 
the Tor network that reveal the location of hidden services have been published.
110
 
Hidden services themselves may also be attacked, such as by installing drive-by-
downloads that reveal details about visitors,
111
 and the Firefox browser has reportedly 
been attacked to target Tor users.
112
 Exit nodes may be operated to read unencrypted 
packets exiting the network,
113
 and other attacks against the Tor network have been 
reported.
114
 Again, there are concerns about the legitimacy of attacks against the Tor 
network, which is also used for legal and pro-social purposes.  
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The final intervention strategy directed towards marketplaces is law 
enforcement control of marketplaces for the purposes of investigation and, ultimately, 
prosecution. This may be achieved directly, as in the DarkMarket example, or through 
the use of informants, such as the Shadowcrew approach.
115
 Although costly, in terms 
of time and resources, further prosecutions may undo the belief that law enforcement 
do not, or cannot, act in relation to these offence types. Prosecutions relating to the 
Silk Road marketplace highlight the importance that law enforcement actions are 
perceived as legitimate, with allegations that the FBI acted unlawfully when obtaining 
evidence.
116
 Whether or not a court of law agrees with these allegations, or even 
considers them, does not decrease the online chatter about the proceedings, or 
necessarily affect the public’s perceptions of legitimacy.  
Discussion and conclusion 
As the problem of cybercrime continues to gain prominence among law enforcement 
agencies, there is a need to understand how various crimes may be best disrupted and 
affected. In particular, the economic harm caused by stolen data markets where 
individuals buy and sell financial information to others around the world cannot be 
underestimated. This paper investigates and considers the range of recommendations 
that have been proposed to disrupt both the actors and the markets where information 
is sold.  
The paper demonstrates that law enforcement agencies and other guardians 
need to evaluate what intervention opportunities are appropriate. Multiple 
interventions coordinated across different guardians, nationally and internationally, 
incorporating different bodies (investigative, regulatory, strategic, non-government 
organisations, and the private sector) that have ownership of the crime prevention 
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problem may reduce duplication of effort, as well as provide a more systematic 
approach with the greatest disruption effect.  
At present, there is virtually no criminological inquiry with respect to 
evaluations of cybercrime intervention strategies, or prevention programs generally. 
Such research is, however, pivotal to ensure a technique or strategy is effective, 
delivering value for money, and that there are no unforeseen or undesirable 
consequences. There is also need for evaluating perceptions of legitimacy and the 
fairness of the processes in which decisions are being made, how power is being 
exercised as well as oversight and supervision of powers.  
Considerations relating to legitimacy, the rights of the law-abiding majority, 
as well as judicial oversight, are relevant to all of the disruption and intervention 
methods. For example, in relation to the legitimacy of attacks lemonising the market, 
questions may be raised about targeting individuals who had not been found to have 
committed a crime by a court of law. Attacks against the infrastructure used to access 
these places, such as the Tor network, for the purpose of disrupting harmful 
behaviours (the trade in stolen data) may also be used to target those whose goals are 
not so nefarious, such as those seeking to avoid censorship, uncovering state 
wrongdoings, or bringing about positive change within repressive regimes. Mass 
surveillance and data collection using backdoors and malware may also result in 
backlash, particularly when the investigative approach is not targeted and where there 
is no judicial oversight, such as a warrant for surveillance devices and communication 
interception.  
Although varied, the disruption methods outlined in this paper aim to increase 
the effort, increase the perceived risk, and reduce the benefits for crime. The 
disruption methods against actors would be easier to undertake in open marketplaces 
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where there is less access control, and therefore the cost of being banned for the 
disruption activities is not as high. While marketplaces may change their methods and 
become closed, or those operating on those marketplaces may displace to more closed 
forums, both of these outcomes increase the required effort for motivated offenders, 
and may limit the number of actors that participate. It appears that low tier, open 
marketplaces are already doing well at disrupting their own economies by being 
known for their rippers. Promoting distrust in these marketplaces may assist with this 
process. 
Though these prospective techniques may be valuable, there is virtually no 
research empirically assessing the application of these techniques in active markets. 
Furthermore, there may be additional disruption methods not covered in this paper. 
As a result, there is a need for substantive evaluation of the utility of market 
disruption strategies. This can only be achieved through direct coordination with law 
enforcement agencies and active research pre and post-intervention. Future research 
exploring these issues with active markets will improve our knowledge of the validity 
of these strategies and demonstrate avenues for future research on cybercrime.  
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